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MODELS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CZMA'S CONCEPT OF
STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS
LEE E. KOPPELMN*
Problems of coastal zone planning,' such as pollution control and
land use regulation, are complicated by the number of discrete federal, state, and local governmental units possessing jurisdiction over
the zone. The Coastal Zone Management Act 2 encourages development of a governmental structure to manage the coastal zone by
requiring that participating states include within their comprehensive management plan a description of the governmental units administering the program and the methods chosen for controlling
land and water uses within the coastal zone. The Act specifies the
available forms of state control: direct regulation by the state, local
regulation in accordance with state-established standards, and local
regulation subject to state review.' This Article will address the
* B.E. College of the City of New York; M.S., Pratt Institute; Ph.D., NewYorkUniversity.
Executive Director, Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, Hauppauge, L.I., N.Y.
1. A majority of the nation's population, 53 percent, now reside in the coastal zone, defined
as the 50-mile-wide belt of land adjacent to the oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Great
Lakes. Some population projections have estimated that approximately 80 percent will live
in the coastal zone by the year 2000. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. II, 1972). General federal land use planning also has received congressional attention. See, e.g., Land Resources Planning Assistance Act, S. 984,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Land Use and Resource Conservation Act, H.R. 3510, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Land Use Policy and Planning Act, H.R. 634, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(4) (Supp. II, 1972).
4. Section 306(e) provides:
Prior to granting approval [of the state's coastal zone management program],
the Secretary [of Commerce] shall also find that the program provides:
(1) for any one of a combination of the following general techniques for
control of land and water uses within the coastal zone;
(A) State establishment of criteria and standards for local implementation
subject to administrative review and enforcement of compliance;
(B) Direct state land and water use planning and regulation; or
(C) State administrative review for consistency with the management program of all development plans, projects, or land and water use regulations,
including exceptions and variances thereto, proposed by any state or local authority or private developer, with power to approve or disapprove after public
notice and an opportunity for hearings.
(2) for a method of assuring that local land and water use regulations within
the coastal zone do not unreasonably restrict or exclude land and water uses of
regional benefit.
Id. § 1455(e).
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latter two options for coastal zone management. It is submitted
that, with modification to meet local needs, these two will best serve
the states in their efforts to achieve a reasonable and consistent
measure of control over developmental policies and actions in the
coastal zone.
SELECTION OF A MANAGEMENT PLAN

Political Considerations
The Act does not specify that politics must be considered in
choosing a form of control, but practically the choice will not be
made until state legislators have weighed the political considerations of each course of action.5 For a coastal zone management plan
to be effective, it must be politically acceptable as well as technically competent; any plan that cannot take the "political heat" is
almost assured of defeat, decline, or impotency.
The factors that must be considered in selecting the appropriate
form of coastal zone management are many, and they extend beyond simply the number of governmental agencies with authority
over the coastal zone and activities within that area. Besides federal, state, and local governments with direct authority, there are
regional and local planning boards which may exercise advisory or
regulatory controls over land uses. If the coastal zone presents an
environmentally cohesive area, such as Long Island Sound or the
Chesapeake Bay, the political considerations are complicated by the
need for coordination with contiguous states that share the coastal
zone.
The home rule practice of the states also is relevant to the choice
of a form of control and would appear to eliminate the first option
specified by the Coastal Zone Management Act, direct state control,
except where such control is limited to a certain function, such as
nuclear plant siting or maintenance of wildlife preserves. Despite
"Dillon's Rule" that municipalities are but "creatures of the state,"6
5. Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Education, Social and Cultural Aspects of
Environmental Problems, Staff Issue Paper (1972), quoted in Krueger, CoastalZone Management-The CaliforniaExperience, SHORE & BEACH, Oct. 1972, at 18.

6. "Dillon's Rule" holds that the general police powers of local governments to adopt
ordinances for the prevention and abatement of nuisances and to regulate "all things detrimental to the public" usually are construed very narrowly with the result that local zoning

and land use regulations may be emasculated by the courts. Thus, although local governments may refuse to relinquish their regulatory powers, they yet may be powerless to effect a
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any attempt to curtail oibrogate local zoning and planning prerogatives would face vigorous, possibly overwhelming opposition. Most
land use and development controls are vested in municipalities as
the result of a long history of enabling legislation. Rebent state
statutes which have established comprehensive or regional land use
plans have followed this pattern and rejected direct state control for
one of the latter two options outlined in the Coastal Zone Management Act, state establishment of environmentally critical areas and
developments followed by local implementation, 7 or local initiation
of plans, guidelines, and control with state review and approval
required for specific classes of actions.8 Only Hawaii has established
coercive coastal zone management plan. See Heath, Legal and InstitutionalConsiderations,
in COASTAL ZONE REsouRCE MANAGEMENT 55 (J. Hite & J. Stepp eds. 1971).
Another aspect of "Dillon's Rule" concerns due process and just compensation in local
government zoning and land use regulation. Any stringent limitation on land use pursuant
to a local coastal zone management plan raises the possibility that courts will overturn it as
a taking of property without due process and just compensation inasmuch as state courts
traditionally have been inclined to give property owners a wide range of alternative uses. See
id. at 65-66. A classic statement of this doctrine was given by the New York Court of Appeals
in Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938): "An
ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation, and must be recognized as a taking
of the property."
A possible solution to this problem is that utilized by several states in their land use
programs, the establishment of a state agency to issue permits for development within the
coastal zone, with the burden of proof on the applicant to establish that the proposed development will have no adverse environmental effect and that it is in conformity with long-range
plans for development of the state coastal zone. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODn § 27402 (West
Supp. 1975); N.Y. ENVIRON ENTAL CONSERVATON LAW § 25-0402 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
This approach has been described as the best solution to due process and just compensation.
Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking Without Just
Compensation, 58 VA. L. Rzv 876, 905 (1972). Courts have upheld exercise of permit authority
under coastal zone management plans as a valid use of the police power. See, e.g., Candlestick
Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 897 (Ct. App. 1970); Horn, Questions Concerning the ProposedPrivateLand Use and
Development Planfor the Adirondack Park, 24 SYR. L. REv. 989, 997 (1973). See also Note,
Coastal Wetlands in New England, 52 B.U.L. REV. 724, 752-61 (1972). The Candlestick
Properties case upheld the permit authority of one of the first coastal zone management
plans, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission. See CAL. Gov.
COoE §§ 66600-53 (West Supp. 1975); Note, Saving San Francisco Bay: A Case Study in
EnvironmentalLegislation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 349 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PuB. Rzs. COD §§ 27000-650
(West Supp. 1975); Site Location of Development Act of 1970, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 481-88 (Supp. 1973); Coastal Area Facility Review Act of 1973, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:191 to -29 (Supp. 1975); Tidal Wetlands Act of 1973, N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW
§§ 25-0101 to -0602 (McKinney Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-91 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:731

state control of planning and zoning.'
The state's home rule practice is, of course, relevant to the choice
between the more limited forms of state participation in coastal
zone management. It can be expected that states with weak executives, strong home-rule traditions, and relatively small bureaucracies would select local control in accord with state-established standards. Conversely, states with strong executives, weaker local governments, and powerful bureaucratic structures would opt for state

review of local actions.
Guidelines for Coastal Zone Planning
Regardless of which form of control is chosen, planners may face
obstacles to effective regulation of coastal zone areas in the form of
controls based upon environmental standards. Given the embryonic
state of environmental science, such standards necessarily are indefinite and thus may not be judicially acceptable reasonable standards for governmental action. Without specific environmental evidence, such standards may be difficult for public agencies to defend
in litigation."
§§ 380.012-.10 (1974). State-established standards are involved in two classes of land activity:
development of state-designated areas of critical state concern and developments with regional impact which are identified by such variables as the size of the site, the unique
qualities of the particular area, and the likelihood of additional development. In both classes
of activities, local governments make the initial development decisions in compliance with
state standards. It has been pointed out that these two categories will be inapplicable to the
vast majority of land development decisions in Florida. Finnell, Saving Paradise:The Florida
EnvironmentalLand and Water ManagementAct of 1972, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 103, 117.
9. Hawaii has enacted legislation establishing a State Land Use Commission with authority to place all lands into one of the following four classifications: urban, rural, agricultural,
and conservation. The first three types are under local control for planning and zoning
purposes; the fourth, under the control of the State Land Use Commission. HAwAn Rnv. STAT.
§§ 205-1 to -15 (Supp. 1974).
10. Most of the coastal zone statutes are worded in a fashion similar to California's statute
which provides that no permit for development within the coastal zone shall be issued unless
the regional commission has found that the proposed development "will not have any substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect." CAL. PuB. Rs. CODE § 27402(a) (West
Supp. 1975). This wording requires courts reviewing decisions of the regional commissions to
determine what constitutes a "substantial adverse environmental effect." The problem is
even more acute with section 27402(b) which requires the development to be consistent with
"the findings and declarations set forth in section 27001 and the objectives set forth in section
27302." Id. § 27402(b). These objectives are even more vague; they include maintaining the
overall quality of the coastal zone, continuing all species of living organisms, avoiding any
irreversible commitment of resources, and continuing the orderly and balanced preservation
of the coastal zone. Id. § 27302. Giving substance to these vague statements to guide develop-
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Two separate studies that attempt to deal with this problem are
nearing completion. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in a jointly funded project with the United States
Geological Survey has produced a set of earth science naps with
interpretive reports for the San Francisco Bay area." The subjects
of the study include coastal geomorphy, erosion, seismicity in the
coastal zone, offshore geology, dune identification, sand supply
data, groundwater and wastewater management, and general mapping. This material is designed to test the application of natural
science information as a resource for the planning process and to
enable planners and land use managers to develop guidelines and
Etandards in a more rigorous fashion.' 2
The second project, conducted in the Long Island area, also is
sponsored by HUD.'3 It is aimed not at developing scientific data,
but at translating such data into information that planners and
policymakers can utilize effectively. These groups must determine
the relevance and applicability of scientific data because of the
reluctance of many natural scientists, either by training or personal
philosophy, to present their findings in other than technical language or to discuss the normative and policy implications of their
work." The essential objectives of the project include the following:
1. To determine the probable environmental impact of the
Comprehensive Development Plan on the marine resources of
Long Island and to determine the influence of the marine environment on the land uses and functional components of the
Plan.
ment decisions presents a challenge to both coastal zone management planners and the
courts, and effective management may be inhibited until definite environmental standards
are established. "Until technically unassailable standards can be developed, the courts lack
sufficient guidelines for decisions concerning what represents 'substantial damage' or'serious
problems."' M. LEVm, J. Rose, & J. SLAvnr, NE w APPROACHES TO STATE LAND-UsE POLCIEs
29 (1974).
A related problem concerns defining the coastal zone. See Heath, supranote 6, at 64. States
have solved this problem differently. California defined its coastal zone as extending from
the highest elevation of the nearest coastal mountain range to three miles out to sea; in some
areas the zone extends five miles inland. CAL. Pus. REs. CODE § 27100 (West Supp. 1975).
New Jersey defined its coastal area in great detail, N.J. STAT. ANm. § 13.19-4 (Supp. 1975).
11. HUD & United States Geological Survey, San Francisco Bay Region Environment and
Resources Planning Study, Draft for Review and Comment (1973).
12. Id. at 1.
13. A METHODOLOGY To AcHImv THE INTEGRATION OF COASTAL ZONE SCIENCE AND REGIONAL

PLANIG (L. Koppelman, Project Director 1974).
14. Id. at 10.
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2. To identify and recommend modifications to the Plan
which can minimize its adverse effects on marine resources.
3. To recommend an institutional framework for implementing the modified Plan based on an assessment of political
and economic feasibility.
4. To evaluate the transferability of the project's methodology and findings.
5. To prepare a set of guidelines for the integration of comprehensive planning and coastal zone management which can
assist decision-makers in other areas. 5
The last point was thought to be particularly important, since one
of the major responsibilities of the states in coastal zone management is the development of criteria and guidelines to be used by
local governments to ensure conformity with state objectives.
Management Considerations
Before evaluating specific models, the general components of
management should be noted. Rational coastal land use control
implies .the existence of at least the following: a set of goals or
purposes, a set of standards to gauge performance, a land use and
conservation plan or statement of performance objectives, a set of
definitions and designations of major critical areas, a fiscal and legal
program to ensure administrative performance and continuity, designated limits for the coastal zone jurisdiction, and an administrative structure properly related by jurisdictional levels. In short, rational control implies knowledge of what is to be controlled, and how
and why it is to be controlled. Since most participants in coastal
zone management are just beginning their efforts, however, and still
have more questions than answers, it is evident that some interim
provisions must serve until all elements of a successful plan are
available.
One such interim approach toward meeting the Coastal Zone
Management Act's requirement of a management program would be
to aggregate all current legislation, regulatory procedures, and administrative processes into a single measure. Presently scattered
provisions pertaining to erosion control, wetlands regulation and
maintenance, and dredging and filling permits, for example, could
be drawn together into an interim plan. Another possibility is the
15. Id. at 10-11.
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imposition of a short-term moratorium against development in the
coastal zone until overall plans are approved, although this option
should be pursued carefully to avoid infringement of private
rights. 6 The necessity is for state and local governments to have
plans that indicate specific areas for specific uses consonant with

the exercise of the police power normally associated with local zoning control. 17 At the state level the regulatory function could be
provided by a procedure of state review of local planning and control
as has been done in California.
LOCAL REGULATION SUBJECT TO STATE REVIEW: CALIFORNIA

The California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Re-

sources, created under the Marine Resources and Conservation Act
of 1967,18 produced a recommended list of principles to guide enactment of coastal zone legislation.19 It concluded that planning and

management is and should be primarily the responsibility of local
government.20 The state should augment this role by establishing
the various "use" criteria and designating areas of critical concern. 2'

Further, a state board, composed of both expert and lay members,

should review and certify local conformity to the state guidelines. 2
The Commission also recommended that the state2 s board have
power to require the periodic updating of local plans.
This early work set the tone for a citizens' effort through the
referendum process to create a California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission.2 4 The law created six regional commissions that
16. This approach was followed by the New York Tidal Wetlands Act of 1973, which placed
a moratorium on alteration of the tidal wetlands of the state until the Commissioner of
Environmental Conservation could develop an inventory of the tidal wetlands and, in cooperation with local governments, a program for their protection and regulations for their use.
N.Y. ENVmROMEWTAL CONSaRVA0oN LAW § 25-0202 (McKinney Supp. 1974). In 1970 Oregon
Governor Tom McCall imposed a moratorium on state activities in the coastal zone while
the planning process continued. Heath, Descriptionsof IllustrativeStateProgramsof Estuarine Conservation,in COASTAL ZONE REsouc MANAGEMENT 162 (J.Hite &J. Stepp eds. 1971).
17. Cf. note 6 supra & accompanying text.
18. Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1642, p. 3934, § 1.
19. Krueger, CoastalZone Management-The CaliforniaExperience,SHORE &BEAcH, Oct.
1972, at 17-18.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 18.
22. Id. at 17-18.
23. Id. at 18.
24. The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act was passed as "Proposition 20" in the
general election held November 7, 1972, with a more than 55-percent majority. Statutory
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follow county lines and have twelve members, six locally elected
officials and six members drawn from the general public. 25 A twelvemember state commission also was established with equal representation from the public and the regional commissions.2 1 By December
1975, the state commission is to submit a comprehensive plan to the
legislature for approval.? During the interim period the regional
bodies are authorized to veto or modify all proposed development
between the three-mile territorial limit in the ocean and a line 1000
yards inland from the mean high water mark.2s Aggrieved parties
can appeal regional actions to the state commission. 9 Part of the
development plan will be an implementation segment with recommendations for needed legislation, funding, and government organization.3 The statute also defined the coastal zone to include the
area between the three-mile territorial limit at sea and inland to the
highest elevation of the nearest coastal mountain range; in some
Comment, Coastal Controls in California: Wave of the Future?, HARv. J. LEGIS. 463, 464
(1974). For a participant's view of the campaign for its passage, see Adams, Proposition20A Citizen's Campaign, 24 SY. L. REV. 1019 (1973).
25. CAL. PUB. Res. CoDE § 27201 (West Supp. 1975).
26. Id. § 27200.
27. Id. § 27320.
28. Id. § 27400 (permit requirement); id. § 27403 (power to modify permits to ensure the
following: access to public beaches; reservation of public recreation areas and wildlife preserves; mitigation of adverse effects from waste treatment and disposal; mitigation of adverse
effects upon scenic resources; and avoidance of danger from floods, erosion, landslides, siltation, or earthquakes).
The six regional commissions received 6236 permit applications during 1973. The great
majority, 5191, were granted, 146 were denied, and 899 remained to be processed at the end
of the year. According to the state commission's annual report, such a high percentage of
permits was granted because a large number of permits were for relatively small developments with minimal environmental consequences and many permits were modified to conform with the Act's requirements, either as a condition to their approval or before their formal
submission to the regional commission. 1973 CAL. COASTAL ZONE CONSERV. CObib'NS ANN. REP.
7 [hereinafter cited as ANN. REP.].

29. CAL. PuB. Ras. CoDE § 27404 (West Supp. 1975). During 1973, 263 decisions of regional
commissions were appealed to the state commission. The state commission declines appeals
unless a substantial issue is presented according to the following criteria: there is substantial,
undisputed evidence to support a decision contrary to that of the regional commission; a
procedural question is involved; a matter of statewide import is involved with a consequent
need for uniformity; or the regional commission decision would adversely affect the coastal
zone plan. ANN. REP., supra note 28, at 8.
30. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27304(e) (West Supp. 1975). Among the other issues which must
be addressed in the plan are land use, transportation, conservation of scenic and natural
resources, public access to recreation, public services and facilities, ocean mining and living
resources utilization, population distribution, and educational and scientific uses of the
coastal zone. Id. § 27304.
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regions of the state the zone may be limited in its inland extension
to five miles if there is no mountain range within that distance from
the sea.31 Figure 1 depicts the California model.
State Legislature
Approval of Regional
Plans
Coastal Zone Legislation

-

12 Member State
Com-ission
Sets criteria, objectives,
guidelines
Appeals Function

6 - 12 Member
Regional Commissions
Plan Development (in
cooperation with local
governments)
Permit Issuance

Figure 1 - LOCAL PLAN DEVELOPHMIUT & REGULATION SUBJECT
TO STATE REVIEW

The California model is not easily transferrable to all other states,
however. It is attractive because of its basic simplicity, state-wide
application, and visible state participation. It also respects local
needs through the regional agencies. The model has such appeal
that a bill patterned on it has been introduced in the New York
legislature.3 The New York proposal is sorely deficient in several
respects, however. It attempts to shift zoning and development controls from the local government to the state,3 while at the same time
assuring local governments that local initiatives could continue if
they were consistent with state requirements and were not of a
"critical" nature.34 In short, the New York bill attempts to achieve
simultaneously two mutually incompatible objectives and becomes
involved in very complex and lengthy drafting, running to 101
pages.
31. Id. § 27100.
The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act has attracted wide comment. See, e.g.,
Statutory Comment, Coastal Controls in California:Wave of the Future?,11 HARv. J. LEGIS.
463 (1974); Note, Saving the Seashore: Management Planningfor the Coastal Zone, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 191 (1973); Note, A Decision-MakingProcessfor the CaliforniaCoastalZone,
46 S. CAL. L. Ray. 513 (1973).
32. New York State Coastal Zone Management Program Act, S. 9586 (1974).
33. Id. §§ 21, 24.
34. Local governments are given jurisdiction over permits for "Class C" projects, subject
to review by the state commission and regional board. Id. § 24(9)(b). Class C developments
are defined as alterations in existing structures not in excess of a 25-percent increase in size
or value; maintenance of existing navigational channels; a public facility located within the
jurisdiction of a local government primarily for the benefit of its residents; any educational
institution primarily serving residents of a local government; and any segment of the transportation system not used primarily for regional or state transportation. Id. § 25(3).
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Application of the California model to New York is clouded further by New York's strong and multiple enabling statutes, including
provisions for charter county governments whose development control measures take precedence over the general municipal laws of
the state. Undoubtedly, the functional and structural changes
called for by the proposal would require omnibus action by the
legislature and numerous referenda. In such a context there is a
need for an approach that can overcome the defects of uncoordinated, fragmented, and often unexercised municipal authority,
while according with the mythology of local planning and control.
LOCAL

CONTROL

PURSUANT

TO STATE STANDARDS: SUFFOLK COUNTY

Since 1965 the Suffolk County (N.Y.) Planning Commission has
participated in a bicounty planning effort to create a comprehensive
land use development plan with siecific attention addressed to
coastal zone planning.35 Incorporated within the overall plan were
detailed guidelines for management of the coastal zone." The effort
recognized the need for an effective management mechanism to
achieve control over coastal zone development and attainment of
the plan's objectives, anticipating in a sense the Coastal Zone Management Act. The approaches developed provide a prototype of a
county-municipal development plan, using various regulatory procedures to be enacted by local governments generally in accordance
with locally designed criteria and applicable state standards. The
local coastal zone plan has been coordinated with the overall state
responsibilities for coastal zone planning and represents the
Nassau-Suffolk portion of the state plan.
As an alternative to assumption of zoning powers by the state, the
role assigned the county or region by this model nonetheless represents an incremental shift of development control to a level higher
than the municipal government. Various public referenda between
1959 and 1972 have transferred from the municipalities to the
35. The Nassau-Suffolk Regional Comprehensive Plan was completed in 1970. Provisions
dealing with land use, transportation, housing, and industry appear in A METHODOLOGY To

PLANNiNG 41-59 (L. Koppelman, Project Director 1974).
36. See Regional Marine Resources Council, Nassau.Suffolk Regional Planning Board,
Guidelines for Long Island Coastal Management, Sept. 1, 1973. The planning guidelines deal
with four areas: coast stabilization and protection; dredging and dredge spoil disposal; integrated water supply and wastewater disposal; and wetlands management.
ACHIEVE THE INTEGRATION OF COASTAL ZONE SCIENCE AND REGIONAL
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county planning agency zoning and subdivision powers including
review of all such matters within 500 feet of the shoreline, all major
highways, county and state facilities, and municipal boundaries. 37
Regarding municipal boundaries, the county's action is conclusive."
Projects within one mile of critical areas, such as airports and nuclear power plants, also are subject to county review.39
The Suffolk County model was not the only available alternative.
The State of New York currently exercises a variety of discrete
operational and regulatory activities through three separate agencies, each independent of the others. These activities-all funnel
through the county planning agency. The initial needs of a management plan thus could be met by the promulgation of an executive
order of the Governor or by statute which could merge the separate
operations under the aegis of a state board, perhaps the state agency
responsible for development of the statewide coastal zone plan. In
practice, however, the local model used in conjunction with specific
state functions offers a more workable alternative to centralized
state planning review.' Figure 2 depicts the New York model.
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37. Surrouc Co. (N.Y.) CIOARRa art. XIII, § 132a (1970).
38. Id. § 1330.
39. Id. § 1323.
State agencies may object to a proposed zoning action referred to the county planning
commission on the grounds that the proposed action is likely to produce water or air pollution
or be destructive of estuarine values. In such a case the local government may not adopt the
zoning action if the planning commission disapproves it, and, if the planning commission
approves it, the local government must adopt any changes made by the planning commission.
Id. § 1327.

40. The model for coastal zone management entailing local government regulation of land
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INTERSTATE COOPERATION IN COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT

Each of the basic models representing the latter two management
forms under the Coastal Zone Management Act is sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of any of the coastal states and territories,
despite the fact that one or the other of the forms may accord better
with the governmental structures or traditions of a certain state.
The flexibility of the basic models is illustrated by their capacity
for expansion to provide for interstate cooperation; the recommendations of a consultant's study of cooperative management forms for
control of Long Island Sound by New York and Connecticut41 demonstrates this interstate application.
Just as totally centralized state control over land use decisions by
municipalities generally would be unsatisfactory, a centralized bistate compact was rejected as a model for development of Long
Island Sound, despite the apparent simplicity of such unitary control.4 2 The geographic cohesiveness of the Sound area is less impor-

tant from the standpoint of land use control than the existing fragmentation of political jurisdiction over the area, jurisdiction over
the region now being distributed among several federal agencies,
two states, the City of New York, and numerous units of local government. Adding to the complexities caused by multiplicity of jurisdictions are the ingrained traditions and laws of home rule, the
legislatively mandated powers and interests of various state agencies regarding the Sound, and the existence of a variety of regional
planning bodies exercising advisory and regulatory powers in the
coastal zone. Pragmatic reasons militate against sweeping these
competing sources of control under a centralized bistate compact.
Such arrangements heretofore have been successful only when limited in function.43 In addition to the fact that most of the land use
problems affecting the Sound are internal to one state or the other,
use with state controls or state-established standards in areas of regional or statewide import
has many advantages. By using existing governmental structures, it minimizes the need for
new agencies, and involvement of state and local, as well as federal agencies, is increased.
However, this "orthodox, marble-cake governmental venture" has its disadvantages: administrative and jurisdictional problems, as well as those of local insularity and attachment to
local customs. See Heath, supra note 6, at 64-67.

41. Raymond, Parish & Pine, Inc., Legal and Institutional Framework for Long Island
Sound Management (1974) (hereinafter cited as Long Island Sound Management].
42. Id. at 10.
43. "[Tihere are believed to be in this country no successful examples of interstate agen-

cies with comprehensive concerns and exclusively regulatory responsibilities." Id.
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those that do require bistate action can be resolved by alternative
means, such as making use of the existing Metropolitan Transportation Authority to link the states by bridge or ferry across the Sound,
without creating another level of government."
Nor does the need for multistate cooperation necessarily require
each state to assume all land use control for its own municipalities.
The long history of enabling legislation that has placed zoning, subdivision control, and official mapping powers at the discretion of
municipal governments cannot be reversed, except for certain limited purposes.15 Although Connecticut utilizes only a two-tier (townstate) governmental structure while New York utilizes a third tier,
the county, particularly in the downstate area including the Sound,
the history of land use control in both states reflects the importance
of the controlling authority delegated to the subunits." Connecticut
has so-called "regional planning agencies," but they are advisory
only and are subject to local control.4' Thus the political and governmental realities in both states militate against state assumption of
all land use control and in favor of the flexibility of local regulation
recommended by the Long Island Sound consultant study.
The study selected a model that provided for local regulation
subject to state review with only a limited transfer of controls to the
states. Seeking a new structure that could weld state and local
participants into a regionwide body with broad scope and powers,
44. Id. at 10-11.
Among the other considerations leading to the rejection of a bistate compact was its potential lack of accountability to the public, lack of financing, and a lack of strong enforcement
of existing laws which could not be remedied in a bistate compact. See id. at 10-12.
45. Id. at 13. Even more important to the rejection of direct state regulation was the
conviction that the state cannot necessarily zone more effectively than local governments can.
Indeed, the need for flexibility and local variations has led commentators to state that zoning
functions should not be transferred to state governments. See Heath, supranote 6, at 59-60.
Past experiences have proven the ability of local governments to protect their fiefdoms. The
law establishing the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) in New York provided that the
corporation could override local zoning powers when the exercise of those powers prevented
specific housing programs in a community. Opposition in Suffolk County to proposed UDC
projects led to a repeal of the override clause in 1973. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6265(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1974).
46. Connecticut's Inland Wetlands Program follows the model of state-suggested regulations and permitted uses for such areas, with implementation by municipal governments. See
Long Island Sound Management, supra note 41, at 14. New York's Tidal Wetlands Act, in
contrast, requires a state permit for certain development activities in tidal wetlands and
provides for state-adopted land use regulations for these areas. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTL CONSERVATION LAW §§ 25-0302, -0401 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
47. Long Island Sound Management, supra note 41, at 13-14.
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the consultants recommended that each state establish a coastal
zone management group (CZMG) and tailor its membership and
functions to respect the state's particular political and administrative customs and laws." Initially, the two state agencies would agree
to a general statement of purposes and goals for the entire program.
Each agency also would develop guidelines for local or regional implementation agencies. These standards would be tailored to the
needs of each state with uniformity necessary only where an activity
affects both states. 9
Discounting direct state exercise of any regulatory powers except
those already in existence, the consultants proposed that delegate
agencies coordinate local actions, thus ensuring the integrity of the
state interests, while maintaining a closer relationship to local governments. In Connecticut this function could be assigned to five
advisory regional planning boards by legislation. In New York the
responsibilities could be assigned to the county planning commissions that already have sufficient enabling legislation. On Long Island the bicounty regional board would be suitable since it already
is the designee for all comprehensive regional and water-related
0
planning.
Land development and conservation plans would be mandatory
for the local units of government. These plans, which could be updates of existing ones or be entirely new, should accord with established standards. To ensure proper management, such plans, which
have been advisory only, should be accorded controlling weight, and
all actions affecting the coastal zone should be subject to them.
State financial aid would be made available to local agencies to
overcome any lack of local resources. In addition, the state CZMG
would be empowered to review the plans and require modifications
to achieve conformity with state purposes. 1
Until local plans can be adopted, the CZMG could impose a
moratorium on any development not consistent with state purposes.
These delegate agencies also would be empowered to prepare plans
for local entities that default on plan preparation and to supplement
any of the local plans with elements pertaining to the region generally. 2 The delegate agencies also would be the permit issuers for all
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
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developments beyond those of purely local concern and for specific
actions reserved to the state by legislation such as wetlands control
or power plant siting. The permit process would be conducted in
conjunction with local review, and any development barred by local
governments for nonconformity with local plans or regulations
would not be issued a permit by the delegate agency. 3 Each state
CZMG would act as the appellate agency for disputed matters, with
suitable procedures built into the model for the protection of private
rights.54 Initially, quarterly meetings are recommended between the
New York and Connecticut CZMG's to achieve overall coordination. "5 Figure 3 depicts the generalized bistate model which could
be expanded for multistate applications.
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CONCLUSION

National concern for protection of the coastal zone does not require significant structural or functional changes in the federal system of intergovernmental relations. The validity of this proposition
is supported by the Coastal Zone Land Management Act which
suggests land use management forms that do not interject the federal government directly into the control of coastal development.
Moreover, although direct state regulation is one of the alternatives
53. Id. at 19.

54. Id. at 20.
55. Id.
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countenanced by the Act, the experience in California and Suffolk
County suggests that regulation by localities, the traditional sources
of land use control, may provide sufficiently flexible alternatives
that direct state intervention may be unnecessary. Through imaginative structuring of state or regional review procedures and the
promulgation by the state of intelligible standards for regulation by
the localities, it is possible to achieve coordinated management of
the coastal zones without incurring the political hazards inherent in
state assumption of all land use controls. The flexible potential of
local regulation under state auspices is quite clearly demonstrated
in the proposals for Long Island Sound by the capacity of such a
model to achieve multistate coordination of coastal zone development.

